

A N
A N A L Y S I S
O F T H E
P H I L O S O P H I C A L W O R K S
O F
Lord Bolingbroke,
By the late unfortunate
Earl F E R R E R S,

For his private Entertainment ;

To which is prefixed,

A Parallel of Earl FERRERS's Case, with that of
Lord SANTRY, a Peer of *Ireland*, both convicted
of Murder: and a SENTIMENTAL LETTER to
a Friend.

—*Morte Triumphat.*

—*In Death be Triumphs.*

L O N D O N ;

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A

P A R A L L E L

O F

Earl *Ferrers*, a Peer of *England*; and
Lord *Santry*, a Peer of *Ireland*'s
Case, both convicted of
MURDER.

HENRY BARRY, late Lord *Santry*, a peer of the kingdom of *Ireland*, tho' of rational and courteous conduct in general when sober, was, when unhappily intoxicated with liquor, prone to every sort of mischief.

Having perpetrated several deeds, of which by bribing evidences, &c. the *Irish* legislature could not satisfactorily convict him, they were however determined to lay hold on the

first fair occasion to punish him for his destructive frolics, and thereby to reconcile the minds of the people, not a little exasperated on seeing so vicious a career pursued with impunity.

At a public meeting in the country, a kind of hanger-on not immediately retiring upon his lordship's ordering the fellow so to do, he received from the lord a violent stab with a *Couteau de Chasse*, of which he expired three months after.—His lordship, when he came to himself, expressed great concern for the rash act he had committed, and imputed it entirely to the temporary frenzy he was instigated by at that time.

The surgeon employed by his lordship to attend the wounded man, was said to be somewhat in fault that he did not recover.

His lordship was brought in guilty upon this question :—If *A* wound *B*, and *B* expire within a year and a day, and that the hurt given by *A*, can be declared to have any way contributed to the death of *B*, is *A* guilty of murder ?—which was declared in the affirmative.

Wynd-

Wyndham, the then chancellor of *Ireland*, and appointed lord-high-steward for the trial of Lord *Santry*, pronounced sentence on him to be hanged, drawn, and quartered at the usual place of execution.—However, this lord by interest made at the British court, was respite from time to time.

The account of Lord *Ferrers*'s crime is too recent in every-body's mind to need being recited here.

Lord *Ferrers*, like Lord *Santry*, is vaguely said to have committed murders before the one for which he was convicted ; and that therefore power, for example-sake, was resolved to seize upon that which they could evince.

One of the murders laid to Lord *Santry*'s charge was of the most wicked complexion ; to wit, his having forced a poor chairman (that had been used to carry him) lying sick a-bed to drink a quart of brandy ; then, with kindled spirits, he set fire to the sheets, &c. the wretch lay in, who soon expired in the most excruciating torture.

Lord *Ferrers* is said to have murdered a postilion ; but that he had bought off all the persons interested to prosecute ; as had the *Irish* peer in the preceding case.

Lord *Santry* had rendered himself generally odious by the barbarous and cruel treatment of his lady, whom he had married through his own liking and choice.

The unfortunate Lord *Ferrers* was in the same predicament.

Lady *Santry*, notwithstanding the cruel treatment she had received, repaired to her Lord during his confinement in the common prison.

The peers of *Ireland* thought that so abandoned a life as Lord *Santry*'s, ought by choice to be sacrificed to justice, and the quieting the people's minds in regard to their personal safety.

It is with all humility conceived that the peerage of *Great-Britain* thought in a like manner, relative to Lord *Ferrers*, notwithstanding any deemed insufficient pleas of madness in his behalf.

Where

Where the parity breaks off is :

Lord *Santry* was most zealously attached to the present illustrious race on the throne; and his grandfather, who may be looked upon as the founder of his family, (being one of the many new ones in that kingdom) had been a great friend to the Revolution, both with money and men, in order to defeat King *James* in *Ireland*.

How the inclinations of that truly respectable, on account of its uncommon antiquity, family of the S——s have been for near half a century, we cannot pretend to say; but the late unhappy Lord, in drunken and frantic hours, is reported to have appeared a violent *Jacobite*, without any the least reserve; as by drinking disaffected toasts in public, and other overt-acts, for which he had been taken notice of. An unequivocal symptom of his insanity of mind.

Lord *Santry*, contrary to the general expectation of the people of *Ireland*, received a respite from his sentence, which happened in, or about the year 1739. He was allowed to retire

retire to *England*, where he passed the remainder of his life.

Lord Ferrers, contrary to the general opinion of the people of *England*, was executed at *Tyburn*, the usual place of execution for all malefactors.

How Lord *Santry* would have met death, had his sentence been carried into execution, we cannot say.

But it can be asserted (as we learn from the account published by the authority of the sheriffs) that no Pagan philosopher, no, not even their boasted *Socrates*, nor any of the primitive Christian martyrs, advanced to the sentenced period of their lives, with more self-collection, or more philosophic intrepidity.

How well qualified he was to speak of Lord *Bolingbroke's* philosophy, in his way from the *Tower* to the fatal tree, will appear from the following judicious extract of that lord's work, and is quite consistent with the rest of his behaviour, as well as the three lines found

found after he had departed from the place of his confinement :

— *In doubt I've liv'd, in doubt I die,*
Yet stand prepar'd the vast abyss to try,
And undismay'd expect eternity.

It is very observable that the worst-hearted people seemed to be the most pleased with the degrading death of this unhappy Earl ;— while the more humane, at the same time that they lauded the justice of his sentence, could not help feeling for him ; and wishing that he had either been assigned to close confinement for life ; or that, agreeable to his own desire, an end were put to it with an axe on Tower-Hill :—on account of his unhinged brain, ancient family, and the unspeakable affliction of a disconsolate mother, &c.

Sed diis aliter visum !

To

[x]

To ----- Esq;

Dear Sir,

BY the tenor of your conversation in our last interview, I soon perceived that from the manner in which you mentioned Lord *Bolingbroke's* works to me, you had but a very little, or rather no opinion of my looking into his or any other production of that kind; which opinion you had no doubt founded, and with the strongest appearance of reason on your side, upon my too habitually dissolute manner of living.

In my cooler moments nobody looks on my past life with more horror than I do:—Ah! my good friend, how happy is that man, upon whose brain the cursed spirit of liquor hath no power.

How grating to reflection is it to find oneself to have been a monster, in the eyes of that very society, which in sober hours it would most cordially embrace, and confer every act of benevolence upon.

Long

Long may you, my honoured friend, whom but for one only article I envy, continue master of yourself ;—pity those who are not.

Be assured, however, that when detached from company my greatest pleasure is reading, and particularly the works of all bold enquirers, who rescue the Sacred Majesty of that Being, alone omnipotent, from the gross misrepresentations of superstition, bigotry, enthusiasm, and errors of every kind.

In them alone I mentally indulge myself ; in them alone can find a relaxation and cheering solace from the many heart-aches which the wild freaks of my unaccountable brain, when crazed with drinking, but too frequently cause.

I can never be sufficiently thankful to all whose kindness and humanity bear with me, in such unsocial and displeasing circumstances. Pray heaven, something fatal may not one day be the consequence. — That apprehension strikes a gloom athwart my mind, and tinges it with melancholy, though you are the object of its present attention.

Beware of the spleen, you may reply.— But let me not become dull and unentertaining by obtruding on you an awkward apology for my (but too often) disagreeableness, when I proposed communicating my sentiments to you, relative to the philosophical works of Lord *Bolingbroke*.

I have read them carefully (nay, do not look amazed) I approve his doctrine ; but think it is too good to be made matter of public property. It is a philosophical ark, containing the truest notions of the Deity ; therefore is too sacred to be exposed to vulgar eyes. Moreover, all innovating attempts to rectify or sublime their received manner of worship, only serves to perplex ; and are oftener productive of evil, than good.

In plain English, I think him wrong to have left it to be published ; though by many passages in his works he seems to think in a manner, that should discountenance his literary legatee's publication.

Yet why leave his works, if not desirous of their appearing one day? This matter Mr. *M.* if candid and ingenuous, may clear up, and let us

us know whether he hath acted in pursuance of a promise ; or in order to make money.

In either sense he has not done the noble autho. character justice ; as he seems to have studied more to eke out the volumes, to swell the size and price, than to prune and lop away redundancies, suppress tedious and prolix repetitions, as well as several wanderings from the subject proposed, which can be easily accounted for, when the work is considered as essays written at different periods, still returning to the same matter, in order to furnish Mr. Pope with materials for his *Essay on Man*.

For the poet has only ranged in order, compacted, and versified what Bolingbroke dictated to him with a noble carelessness, and philosophic negligence.


Had his lordship published these essays, I am convinced he would have done it in a more methodic, and infinitely more concise manner.

A proof of this my opinion I send you inclosed in an extract I have made, containing all that is essential in them, disincumbered

bered from every unnecessary and voluminous
compiling of words.

If you should approve, pray keep it ;—for if you return it ; so great a contempt have I for any thing I can write, I shall certainly burn it.

I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.



ADVERTISEMENT.

NO other motive than a debt to friendship could have given rise to the publication of the preceding letter, as well as to the annexed abridgment of Lord *Balingbroke's* Philosophical Works, in order to clear the memory of a late noble peer from the many cruel aspersions wickedly thrown out against him.

From what is here offered, the sensible and candid may conclude, that when in a sober way of thinking, he was an intelligent, benevolent, and valuable member of society ; and that there is ample reason, for the sake of

of mankind, to regret his having ever been otherwise; but,

Quisque suos patimur manes.


The most virtuous at best, are but those guilty of the fewest faults;—and sure the most pardonable are those caused by any hereditary distemper in the brain.

Let those then thank the Almighty for having what is no merit in themselves—the poet's

Mens sana in corpora sano,

but look and think with pity upon whoever is dealt less favourably with by Providence.

☞ It is to be wished, that a complete enquiry between ideotism and lunacy, had been ordered, for the thorough satisfaction of every doubting mind.



AN ABRIDGMENT, &c.

REASON is a faculty, or rather an aggregate of faculties, that is bestowed in different degrees, and not in the highest certainly, on those who make the highest pretensions to it.

It is more easy to deal with ignorance than with error.

The self-interest of some men, the madness of others, and the venal pride of the human heart, determines them to prefer error to truth, and authority to reason.

B

Truth

Truth and reason are no enemies to the purity nor to the ornaments of language: but as the want of an exact determination of ideas, and of an exact precision in the use of words, is inexcusable in a philosopher, he must preserve them even at the expence of style.

There are separate interests, to mention them in general only, of prejudice and of profession. By the first, men set out in the search of truth under the conduct of error, and work up their heated imaginations often to such a delirium, that the more genius and the more learning they have, the madder they grow. By the second, they are sworn as it were to follow all their lives the authority of some particular school, to defend certain doctrines, and even mere forms of speech without examination; or to examine only in order to defend them.

To speak the truth, though it may seem a paradox, our knowledge on many subjects, and particularly those which we intend here, must be superficial to be real. This is the condition of human knowledge.

We

We are placed as it were in an intellectual twilight, where we discover but few things clearly, and few entirely, and yet see just enough to tempt us with the hope of making better and more discoveries.

To be contented to know things as God has made us capable of knowing them, is then a first principle necessary to secure us from falling into error.

God is hid from us in the majesty of his nature; and the little we discover of him, must be discovered by the light that is reflected from his works.

The less men know, the more they believe they know: belief passes in their minds for knowledge; and the very circumstances which should beget doubt, produce increase of faith.

Scævola and Varro held, that not only many truths were to be concealed from the vulgar; but that it was expedient the vulgar should believe many things that were false.

The Greek (Plato) and Romans (Scævola and Varro) thought that things evidently false might deserve an outward re-

spect, when they are interwoven into a system of government: this outward respect every good citizen will shew them in such a case; and they can claim no more. He would not propagate these errors, but he will be cautious how he propagates even truth in opposition to them.

Every one has an undoubted right to think freely; nay, it is the duty of every one to do so, as far as he has the necessary means and opportunities.

In general, nothing can be more absurd than to take opinions of the greatest moment, and such as concern us the most intimately, on trust: things the most absurd in speculation become necessary in practice.

Clearness and precision are the two great excellences of human laws. By refuting one and the other when they differ, the clergy have made it no hard matter to refute them both when they agree. Where mystery begins, religion ends.

It is the modest, not the presumptuous enquirer who makes a real and safe progress in the discovery of divine truths: he follows

lows nature and nature's God ; that is, he follows God in his works and in his word.

In natural religion the clergy are unnecessary ; in revealed they are dangerous guides.

The *mind* is the secret spring of *thought*, unknown, and unknowable.

Our *ideas* are the foundations or the materials, call them which you please, of all our *knowledge*.

The *first ideas* with which the mind is furnished are received from *without*, and are caused by such *sensations* as the presence of *external objects* excites in us, according to the *laws of passion and action* which the *Creator* has established.

We are far from knowing how *body* acts on *body*, or *spirit* on *spirit* ; how *body* operates on *mind*, and produces *thought* ; or how *mind* operates on *body*, and produces *corporeal motion*.

Our *ignorance* of *causes* does not hinder our *knowledge* of *effects*.

This *knowledge* has been thought *sufficient* for us by *infinite Wisdom*.

Sensa-

Sensation is the greater, Reflection the smaller source of ideas.

I think, I reflect, I will; therefore I am.

In the enumeration of these faculties, by the exercise of which our minds proceed in acquiring knowledge after *perception*; *Retention* or *memory* ought to follow, and next the faculty of *compounding simple and complex*, and of *comparing ideas*, which is a lesson of *nature*; she takes us by the hand, and leads us by *experience* to *art*.

Nature then has united in distinct substances (as we commonly speak) various combinations of those qualities, each of which causes in us the sensation it is appropriated to cause, and our organs are fitted to receive; so that several being thus combined, and making their impression together, may be said to cause a *complex sensation*.

The *complex idea* we have of every substance, is nothing more than a combination of several *sensible ideas*, which determine the *apparent nature* of it to us.

Ideas of things computable, and measurable, are the objects of mathematics.

Ideas

Ideas of moral and immoral actions are the objects of ethics.

Distinguish between *ideas* and *notions* — for as we compound *simple* into *complex ideas*, so the compositions we make of *simple* and *complex ideas*, may be called more properly, and with less ambiguity, *notions*.

Modes are the affections and dependencies of substances ; relations are the affections and dependencies of substances and modes, and no one of them can exist any longer than both the ideas that produced it, or by the comparison of which it was framed, subsist. That which does or seems to produce the alteration, gives us the idea of *cause* ; and that which receives the alteration, gives the idea of *effect*.

Human knowledge is nothing else than the perception of the agreement or disagreement, connection or repugnancy of our ideas. Those that are simple must determine the nature of those that are complex ; those that are complex that of our notions ; our notions that of the principles we establish ; and that of the principles

ciples we establish, that of all the consequences we draw from them: error in any one step of this gradation begets error in all that follow.

The same outward objects produce the same sensations in all men, as far as self-preservation is immediately concerned; and there is at least an *apparent* uniformity of sensations in all other cases sufficient to maintain the commerce of men one with another; to direct their mutual offices without confusion, and to answer all the ends of society. Further than to these purposes, the determination of our sensations does not seem to be in all the same.

Human knowledge is *relative*, not *absolute*.

Metaphysics is a supposed science, like an higher ground from which we might descend to physics, from generals to particulars; from speculations about what may be, down to affirmations about what is.

Our real knowledge goes no further than particular experiments: as we attempt to make it general, we make it precarious.

Sense

Sense and intellect must conspire in the acquisition of physical knowledge; but the latter must never proceed independently of the former.

When our *senses* fail us in natural philosophy, whose object is *actual* not *possible* existence, our *intellect* is of no use.

But this is sure, that although knowledge acquired facilitates the acquisition of more to a certain point; yet the progress we attempt to make beyond that point, grows more and more difficult, and becomes a little sooner or a little later quite impracticable.

Philosophers have found it more easy and more compendious to *imagine*, than to *discover*; to *guess*, than to *know*.

Learning, with the antient naturalists of *Greece*, was no longer the study of nature by observation and experiment; but consisted in a jargon of words, or at best some vague *hypothetical* reasonings.

Hypotheses may be employed without being abused. In all our attempts to account for the phænomena of nature, there will be something hypothetical necessarily

C included.

included. The *analytic* method itself, our surest road to science, does not conduct us further than extreme probability, as it has been observed; and this *probability* must stand us in lieu of *certainty*—but when we cannot arrive by this method at such a *probability*, is it reasonable to make an *hypothesis*?

When the phænomena do not point out to us any sufficient reason why, and how a thing is, as we discover it to be, nor the efficient cause of it, there is a sufficient reason for stopping short, and confessing our ignorance; but none for seeking out of the *phænomena* this reason, and this cause, which we cannot find in them. This is *learned ignorance*, of which the greatest philosophers have no reason to be ashamed; and how preferable to that *ignorant learning* of which so many have foolishly boasted!

Nothing can be more consistent than to acknowledge a Supreme Being, the source of all existence, the first efficient cause of all things; and to account for the phænomena by physical and mechanical causes, by matter and motion.

We should never suffer, much less encourage, imagination to rove in the search of truth. To know things as they are, is to know truth; to know them as they may be, is to guess at truth. Judgment and observation guide to one, imagination and speculation to the other: imagination submitted to judgment will never go beyond knowledge founded on experience, or high probability, immediately deducible from it.

The mind wanders easily, and is more easily led into error about modes and relations, than about substances.

The sole criterion we have of immaterial spirit is our own *spirit*. The idea we have of *thought* by *reflection*, is as clear as that we have of *extension* by *sensation*. The ideas of some few modes of *thinking* are as clear as those we have of numberless modes of *extension*.

All spirits are hypothetical, except the Infinite Spirit, the Father of Spirits, the Supreme Being.

Words are *signs*, not *copies* of ideas.

Our simple ideas are as many as the sensible qualities of outward objects that excite them in us. But the various combinations of these simple into complex ideas of substances are innumerable, and yet each of these combinations is as distinctly and uniformly perceived by us, as the simple ideas contained in it.

The distinction between ideas and notions is, the former are particular in their nature, and general only by their application; and the latter, general in their nature, and particular only by their application.

There is scarce any error more gross, or of more extensive influence than *this* that supposes a power in the mind which the mind has not; and the *reality* of ideas of general natures: though these cannot exist abstractedly from particulars.

Words are the counters of wise men, but the money of fools: ideas and notions are the money of wise men, and they pay with these; whilst they mark and compute with words, the money of fools.

Great

Great heat of imagination and great coolness of judgment, form genius.

Rhetoric applies images framed or borrowed by imagination, to ideas and notions which are framed by judgment, so as to warm the affections, to move the passions, and to determine the will; so as to assist nature, not to oppress her.

The doctors of abstraction therefore require that we should believe against knowledge; and those of inspiration, that we should believe without it. The term of inspiration is a figure that gives us no intellectual idea, because it is not really the image of any.

We are sometimes obliged in philosophical as well as in common discourse, to make use of words that have no determinate, nor indeed, properly, any ideas or notions at all annexed to them—Chance--Contingent--Force--Grace.

Our ignorance of causes, our curiosity, and the extravagant opinions of philosophers about them, are equally great. Let us content ourselves to understand, when we speak of *cause* in general, *that* by the imme-

immediate or remote, the physical or moral virtue, whereof any thing is what it is, or any thing is done as it is done.

Ideas are real and fantastical — maxims and axioms, when evident, are the result, not principles of science.

Philosophers invent hypothetical ideas and notions, in order to erect on them such systems as cannot be erected on real ones; that is, having a known foundation in nature.—They treat of them when incomplete and inadequate, as if complete and adequate.—They dogmatize on obscure and confused ideas and notions, as if clear and distinct.

Hypotheses might be reckoned among those arts of the mind that degenerate into artifice.—Solidity, extension, figure, divisibility, and mobility, are the most apparent properties of body or matter.

In the general opinion the soul is a spiritual substance, unextended, indivisible, and therefore immortal.

Human knowledge is derived from existence; and to be real it must be conformable to things as they exist.

Theists

Theists demonstrate the existence of one supreme, infinite, all-perfect Being: *Atheists* cavil.

Without *thinking* the body would be unable to begin *motion*, and to perform many necessary corporeal operations. Without a *body* the soul would be unable to acquire the first elements of knowledge, the materials of thought.

In natural theology human reason, that is, common sense, is the sole judge; and the greatest doctor has no more right to impose his authority on me, than I have to impose mine on him.

We have such ideas by sensation, as the various powers of that substance called *body* are ordained to produce in us; and we have such ideas by reflection, as the inward operations of that which we call *spirit*, be it substance or faculty, excites in us; that is, we have clear and determinate ideas of *what* we call *body* by *sensation*, and of *what* we call *spirit* by *reflection*: but when we go beyond a few apparent properties, wherof we are fitted to have ideas, and which have been already

ready discovered, it is one continued petition of principle.

One hypothesis wants another to support it; that a third, and so on, till *philosophy* grows to be what it always has been, an aggregate of motley systems, partly real, and partly fantastical.

Ideas that are false, may be very clear perceptions in the mind.

—*Gigni pariter cum corpore, & una
Crescere, sentimus, pariterq; senescere mentem.*

The human mind or soul is an intellectual mirror that reflects from the phænomena of nature alone, and therefore indirectly some very few ideas of the supreme Being; beyond the demonstrative knowledge that we have of his existence. It is the kind, not the degree of knowledge that is concerned, and to be compared.

To observe the constitution and order of things in the physical and moral systems to which we belong; to form general ideas, notions, axioms, and rules, on these particulars; and to apply them back again

again to human action and human sense, constitutes knowledge: and the result of the whole is wisdom; human knowledge, and human wisdom are synonimous.

The influence of reason is slow and calm; that of the passions sudden and violent.

A certain concurrence of fabulous traditions may hold out with sufficient evidence some general truths.

Some have pretended to be divinely inspired; and divine inspiration, as well as divine institution, implies an authority far superior to any that is merely human.

Ecclesiastical and civil constitutions grew up together; and that people who submitted to kingly, might submit the more easily to priestly government, because the priests who had used to lead them by superstition, had acted in concert with their kings to make those establishments. Kings wanted their influence over the people; the people wanted their influence over kings: and kings and people were both silly enough to imagine that they wanted

D such

such a protection from the gods—such an intercourse with heaven.

Though civil government cannot subsist so well without religion, religion may subsist, and flourish too, without ecclesiastical government—

This propagated error in philosophy, and superstition in religion.

Their (the clergy's) wealth and immunities are as exorbitant as their authority and power.

The useful distinction of an outward and inward doctrine was invented, one for the vulgar, and one for the initiated.

In divine matters the marvellous, the improbable, nay, the impossible and the unintelligible, make the strongest impression on vulgar minds.

Allegory, in the true intention of it, is designed to make clearer as well as stronger impressions on the mind.

There may be good reasons for concealing, there never can be any such for disguiising, which is a degree of falsifying truth.

The

The original *impressions* that divine wisdom and power made uniformly on all matter, or differently on the different elements of it, proceed from the inconceivable energy of the first efficient cause, the order of second causes proceeding from *them*, and which I call the laws of nature.

We must take care not to make humanity the measure of divinity; and much more, not to make the last the least of the two.

Of divine goodness and justice I am unable to frame any adequate notions. And we ought perhaps to conceive nothing more than this, that there are various applications of one eternal reason, which it becomes us little to analize into attributes.

Metaphysicians have always proceeded on a false supposition, by neglecting the real phænomena of the human mind, and by ascribing to it an imaginary power.

Our affections and passions put frequently a bias so secret, and yet so strong on our judgments, as to make them swerve from the directions of right reason.

Authority stands in the place of *reason*; men defend what they never examined, and explain what they never understood: their *philosophical system*, or *religious institution*, to which they were determined by chance, not by choice, is to them the rock of truth, on which alone they can be saved from error—This, to the *academicians*, was DOUBT!

Ideas may be clear and distinct in the mind, and yet be fantastical, or only have a metaphysical reality: we must proceed by a slow gradation of intermediate connecting ideas, from particulars to generals. In short, he who imagines that he can extend general knowledge, by the force of pure intellect and abstract meditation, beyond the foundations that he has laid in particular knowledge, is just as mad in thinking he has what he has not, as he who thinks he is what he is not.

Human knowledge, to be *real*, must be derived from, and tried by, what *really* is.

The true art of thinking must be the same among all mankind, since their intellectual system, and the things of nature

from which their ideas and notions ought to be abstracted, are the same. Otherwise *art* should direct *practice*; whereas *practice* ought to direct *art*.

What contradictions and inconsistencies are not huddled together in the human mind! Superstition is produced, by a sense of our weakness; philosophical presumption, by an opinion of our strength; and they both contribute alike to continue, to confirm, and propagate error.

Though all are not placed on the same level, there is a level above which no man can rise: and he who compares the nature of his mind with the nature of things, will be sure to find it.

There would be more real knowledge and more true wisdom among mankind, if there was less *learning* and less *philosophy*.

Faith and reason, revealed and natural knowledge, ought to be always distinguished; lest one should be confined, and the other extended too much: and divines and philosophers should keep in their distinct provinces.

The

The zeal of bigots make it no less critical to reject the abuses of religion, than to profess *atheism*.

Men are apt, and even the most judicious sometimes, to erect their scanty knowledge of a few particulars into a supposed general and certain knowledge of any subject.

Great men take great liberties, and expect to be believed on their words, *avtos epon*. When enquiries are carried beyond the bounds of human knowledge, then the dispute is about words.

The same testimony is *good* when it makes *for*, but *bad* when it makes *against*.

When metaphysics and theology are made sciences, and become the professions of orders of men, who increase their consideration in the world, or advance their temporal interests, by creating an appearance of *mystery* where there is *none*, or by increasing it where it is, the simplicity of religion will be lost of course, and *natural* theology will be transformed into *artificial*.

I am

I am not scholar enough to presume to affirm on wild conjecture: I dare go no farther than sufficient probability leads me, and sufficient vouchers support me.

Incredulity may be founded on *credulity*, and *positiveness* on *ignorance*; which is the general case of bigots in the *west*, as well as in the *east*.

Learning *emboldens*, and zeal is apt to *transport*.

God, trusting neither to the impressions of himself that are visible on the whole face of nature, nor to the reason he gave to man, communicated this knowledge, and directed this worship by immediate revelations.

Reason has been too much employed, where it has nothing to do; and too much neglected, where it has most to do.

To work effects contrary to the intention of them is a fate that very frequently attends the best of human expedients; and the reflection does no honour to our wisdom and foresight.

Truth

Truth is disguised or concealed by the false opinions of men, that last for a time only; but the other prevails always.

The same principle of knowledge, derived from the same use of reason, took various appearances from the various opinions that were complicated with it in the minds of men; much as the same virtue takes a different hue, according to the different tempers, characters, and circumstances of those who profess and practise it.

The knowledge of the true God must have been uncertainly propagated and uncertainly maintained; it must have been never lost, but always liable to be darkened, by too much ignorance and stupidity in some, and too much imaginary knowledge and the endless refinements of opinions in others.

Revelation has had no better success than *reason*: neither has been able to preserve the purity of the doctrines they taught, nor an uniformity in the practice they prescribed.

Christianity

Christianity has been, from the institution of it, in a perpetual flux; not relatively to certain opinions alone, that may be deemed indifferent, or what not quite essential; but relatively to fundamental articles, on which the whole system leans.

The knowledge and worship of the one true God must have been the religion of mankind for a long time, unconfined to any particulars, family, or nation.

Almost all men are guided by the understandings of others, not by their own; and may be said more truly to *adopt* than to *beget* their opinions.

Prejudices are established by education,
habits by custom.

Though he who has read much will not arrive at truth so soon, nor so surely, as he who has thought much, yet will he make a greater glare, and draw more admiration to himself.

The true foundations of natural *theology*
must be laid in natural *philosophy*.

The duties of natural *religion*, and the sins against it, are held out to us by the

E consti-

constitution of our nature and by daily experience.

She tells us nothing which our *reason* is unable to comprehend; and much less any thing which is repugnant to it: *they* are always agreed, and always the same.

Religions founded in the pretended revelations we speak of here, grow voluminous and mysterious, oppose belief to knowledge, and, when they cannot stand a reasonable examination, escape from reason by assuming that they are above it.

An end to which the means are not proportioned, can never be the end of infinite wisdom seconded by infinite power.

Right reason is always on the side of truth, is *truth*, and can never differ from itself.

One side affirmed, and the Nicean council decreed, that the Son was *ομοθεος*, that is, consubstantial with the Father, *habens simul essentiam*, i. e. *eandem essentiam*. The Arians, most of them at least, would have acknowledged him to be *ομολογος*, that is, of similar substance, “ *habens*

“ habens similem essentiam.” But the holy council adhered, and the Arians were all damned for the difference of an *iota*.

What have we not reason to fear concerning that text, on which they (councils) have all pretended to be founded, and wherein it is said that there are thirty thousand various readings.

The want of original, or of an attested copy, is a want of proof.

We have no more right to add to the word of God, than we have to alter it: the same revelation which gives us divine knowledge, in what proportion soever it be given, and how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity and our imaginary want, confines it likewise.

Natural revelation (so I will call it) produces knowledge; a series of sensitive and intuitive knowledge from the first principles to the last conclusions, &c. In all these cases we *know*; we do not *believe*: but in the case of supernatural revelation, when it is traditional, we can have nothing more than opinion, supported by human authority, and by decreasing probability afterwards.

If we are not obliged to believe without reason, can we be obliged to believe against it? How absurd is, "Believe first, and understand afterwards." *Calvin's* inward testimony of the spirit alone.

The sects of *Omar* and *Aly* detest each other as much as both do *Christianity*.

Nothing shews more than *religion* the weakness of *humanity*.

No religion ever appeared in the world, whose natural tendency was so much directed to promote the peace and happiness of mankind, as the *Christian*: why it has often otherwise happened, *theology* only is in fault.

Christianity is founded on the universal law of nature; I will not say that it is a republication thereof, which is *universal benevolence*.

Not only self-preservation, but a desire to be happy, are the immediate or improved effects of a natural instinct; the first in the whole animal kind, the last in the human species at least.

Pleasure, which is temporary, not real happiness, passes for it, and is alone the object of appetite and passion.

If we consider effects, the law of nature is as much a law, as the law of the gospel, and creates as really an obligation to prefer good to evil.

The *Morality* of actions does not, I think, consist in this, that they are prescribed by will, even the will of God; but in this, that they are the means, however imposed the practice of them may be, of acquiring happiness agreeable to our nature. It regards manners and the conduct of life.

The law of nature (or natural religion) as it is the most important, is the plainest of all laws.

External duties have been multiplied by ecclesiastical policy, that profited of the natural superstition of mankind.

It is not true that *Christ* revealed an entire body of Ethics, proved to be the law of nature from principles of reason, and reaching all the duties of life.—

Revelation was not given to do what reason could do alone. It was not given to convince men of the reasonableness of *morality*, but to enforce the practice of it by a superior authority.

Reason commands what a man may by the force of reason perform. Revelation commands what it is impossible to obey without an assistance unknown to reason.

Men will always stop short of that pitch of virtue which is proposed to them, and it is therefore right to carry the notions of it as high as possible ; whose sublime precepts are so little inconsistent with the law of nature, that they are this very law carried beyond the original terms of it.

It is evident, that indulgence to the Jews and to the Gentiles, in order to gain both, was a fundamental principle of apostolical conduct from the first preaching of the gospel.

What a bustle among the successors of the apostles about keeping Easter ! The Christian church of Jerusalem *judaised* during the succession of fifteen bishops. Ointment, holy water, incense, tapers, the consecration of altars, and the celebration of *jubilees*, are of this kind.

The divine right of tithes was established by the law of *Moses* : by virtue of that law
the

the Christian priesthood claim it. The *Naxi* was the pontiff of the *Jews*, and the head of their church: hence an argument the more for the supreme authority of the *pope*.

Councils are derived from the *Sanbedrim*; and the whole system of the hierarchy, and of ecclesiastical regimen, from the constitution of the Jewish church.—Let us learn to distinguish rightly between those things the gospel requires, and those which the church imposes. *Superstition* is folly; *Enthusiasm* is madness—Beware of both!—

Dire effects have not been caused by the gospel, but by the systems raised upon it: not by the revelations of God, but by the inventions of men.

Original and traditional proofs are to be distinguished, as well as the original and traditional matter of revelations.—The gospel of *Christ* is one thing; that of *Paul*, and of all those who have grafted after him on the same stock, is another.

The articles of belief which *Christ* himself exacted by what he said, and by what he did, have been lengthened immeasurably,

ably, and we add, both unnecessarily and presumptuously, by others since his time.

Explanations multiply disputes, and establish religion on human instead of divine authority: this, like God, is invariable; the other fluctuates.

Nothing more was required of the Gentiles, than to abstain from idolatry, or meats offered to idols, from fornication, and from blood.

By *faith* I may *believe*; by *faith* I cannot *understand*. In general the *Platonic* and *Christian* systems have a very near resemblance.

Apollo appeared to *Aristo*, *Plato*'s father, and forbid him to enjoy his wife for the space of ten months; which was a very unnecessary precaution, if the poor man had often tried, and never could; and if *Perictione* was a virgin when the same god appeared to her in a vision, and she conceived. Thus he was begot, to be a physician of souls, as *Aesculapius* was, to be that of bodies.

Faith in *Christ*, the *Messiah*, is the first principle of Christianity; an article as plain as essential. The

The weight of reason, and not the authority of an author, should decide our opinions.

In philosophy as in religion, &c. excess on one side produces excess on the other. So *Sabellianism* gave occasion to *Arianism*, and the *foppery* of *Rome* to the *rusticity* of *Geneva*.

The *Acataleptics* maintained, that we are unable to arrive at the truth of things by sense or reason.

Socrates may be compared to the *Cimmerians*, who were deprived of the light of the sun, but were not in utter darkness.

Plato disputed for and against many things; inquired about all, and advanced none as certain: he is often called, the *Homeric philosopher*, the Attic *Moses*, and compared to *Christ*.

Philosophers, whilst Pagans, disputed without quarrelling; and even embraced opposite sects without becoming enemies.

Heresy from having, as I believe, a very innocent signification at first, came, like the word *tyrant*, and some others, to convey a very odious *idea* at last—Then here-

tics were called enemies to God, and rebels to his law.

Men run naturally from extreme to extreme.

Reformation is often nothing more than a change of error. *Mythology*, properly so called, served in the infancy of science to conceal the ignorance of philosophers.

The principles of revelation are lost in theology, or disfigured by it; and whilst some men are impudent enough to pretend, others are silly enough to believe that they adhere to the gospel, and maintain the cause of God against infidels and heretics; whence they do nothing better nor more than espouse the conceits of men, whom enthusiasm, or the ambition of forming sects, or of making a great figure in them, has inspired.

We should embrace and hold fast the articles of faith and doctrine that were delivered in plain terms, or in unequivocal figures: we should not be dogmatical where the sense is doubtful, nor presume even to guess where the Holy Ghost left the veil of mystery undrawn.

The

The best way of preserving doctrines, is to preserve them in the writings of the authors of them, though even this cannot be deemed absolutely secure. The next, is to preserve them in the writings of disciples that immediately received them from the authors. The third, and more imperfect, is by those who wrote at a larger distance of time. The last, is oral tradition, the most liable to defect and corruption of any.

Christianity, as it came out of the hands of God, if we may use the expression, was a most simple and intelligible rule of belief, worship, and manners. As soon as men presumed to add any thing of their own to it, the human alloy corrupted the divine mass, and it became an object of vain, intricate, and contentious science: such it continued to be; and the very manner in which truth was propagated, served to establish error.

Ecclesiastical tradition has been from the first and purest ages founded, for the most part, in ignorance, superstition, enthusiasm, and fraud.

The kingdom of theology is the kingdom of darkness ; and to enjoy the true light of the gospel we must fly from it.

That *religion* is necessary to strengthen, and that it contributes to support, cannot be denied, without contradicting reason and experience both : but it is necessary to distinguish clearly between what is really religion, and what has been industriously, and is now habitually confounded with it, and made to pass for it.

Neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine distinct and independent societies in the same *society*. *Imperium in imperio*.

Political societies make and alter and break their alliances, as the varying reason of the state suggests. Different orders of civil government, in the same society, change ; and with them the whole constitution of such governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions of men, determine them.

To whatever sect we addict ourselves, if we are saved, it must be on the faith of man, it cannot be on that of God ; for the

the pure word of God neither is nor ever has been the sole criterion of orthodoxy.

Christianity, as the Saviour published it, is full and sufficient to the purposes of it. Simplicity and plainness shewed that it was designed to be the religion of mankind, and manifested likewise the divinity of its original.

A system of natural law, enforced by a divine mission and a divine sanction, had nothing in it that was new.

Christianity was taught first, and propagated afterwards, by word of mouth. The apostles, the disciples, and the first converts, in general, were ignorant, illiterate persons.

Madness and phrensy may be called divine illumination, mystical rapture, or holy zeal.

Ignorance and learning conspired to turn the plainest religion that ever was into a chaos of theology; from which it has never been reduced again to an uniform, consistent, and intelligible system.

All have pretended submission to the authority of God: all, without exception,
 orthodox,

orthodox, as well as heretics, have submitted in truth to the authority of man. Numberless human institutions have divided a world, that the divine might have united; and instead of universal peace, founded on universal benevolence, the natural effect of the latter, they have caused and maintained perpetual discord, hatred, wars, persecutions, and massacres.

Various gospels, various epistles were current; they were all received in some of the churches at least. What they contained that are not come down to us, we know not. The boasted chain of tradition was not uniform in some of the most important points.

The divine nature cannot be explained by human words; for it cannot be conceived by human ideas: and therefore none but delirious metaphysicians, who employ words that impose by their sounds, and have no determinate ideas affixed to them, will ever attempt the explanation. Speak cautiously and reverently of it, according to the general notices, of wisdom, power, and majesty, &c. from the works of God.

The Pagan doctrine of a trinity was more antient than tradition.

None of the Pagan trinitarians had ever imagined three Gods essentially one, and one God essentially three: whenever they spoke of three *hypostases*, they all supposed them distinct and subordinate.

An affectation of investigating and explaining the original and first principles of things, was the reigning folly of antient philosophers. What they could not account for by any knowledge they had of the sensible world, they endeavoured to account for by the hypotheses they framed of an intellectual world.

He who considers what our manner of knowing is; what the faculties of our minds are; and how uncertain, how precarious, how confined it is in the highest degree of it, will think the soul as unfit to be participant of the divine nature, as the body.

Plato required faith in traditional doctrines.

These words, the Son of God, were understood figuratively, I presume, and not

not literally, in the case of *Foë*, who assumed this appellation in India a thousand years before the coming of *Christ*, was said to be born of a virgin, and bred in a desert till thirty years old under a *Jougi*, then preached a missioned saviour: and also in the case of *Zoroaster*, who assumed it in Persia perhaps at that time.

The divinity of the word grew by slow degrees into general belief among Christians; the divinity of the Holy Ghost by degrees still slower; and the co-equality and consubstantiality of the three hypostases last of all.

The orthodox doctrine of the trinity was never taught explicitly and positively by any divine authority. The Old Testament contains no notices of the *trinity*.

Theology has solemnized the reveries of enthusiasm in many instances.

As some were afraid of destroying the unity by the *trinity*, others were afraid of destroying the *trinity* by the *unity*. The *Unitarians* took away all distinction of persons, and the *Trinitarians* held they were all equal.

Pride

Pride and obstinacy of temper, under the name of zeal, render equally fit to persecute and bear persecution. The clergy never give up a point which ambition or interest, enthusiasm or humour, has made any of them advance: lions to their inferiors, but fawning dogs to the great.

If *Christianity* was not, *Christian* theology, which has passed for it ever since, and has done so much hurt under that notion, was established by the sword, and by every kind of persecution.

The marvellous in matters of religion, that is presumed to be revealed, will impose and affect more than truth and reason.

Fathers of the church and councils have imposed their own imaginations, and perhaps their mistakes, for revealed doctrines and divine truths, cursing and persecuting all those who dissented from them.

The scene of Christianity has always been the scene of dissention, of hatred, of persecution, and of blood.

The doctrines of predestination and of unlimited passive obedience are of the utmost absurdity.

In the fourth century the clergy, some few good and learned, but not infallible men excepted, was ignorant, contentious, and profligate: the councils were riotous assemblies, governed by intrigue, and celebrated with noise, confusion, and the greatest indecency.—The church did not grow better, if it could not grow worse, afterwards.

There is a sort of holy ambition, which proves as strong a motive in the hearts of good men transported by a mistaken zeal for the church, whose cause they confound with that of religion; as that profane ambition which means nothing more than to advance, under pious pretences, the grandeur, wealth, and dominion of the religious over the civil society, is in the hearts of hypocrites and knaves.

These two sorts of ambition help one another mutually.

No formal alliance, as between independent and distinct powers, but a fraudulent

dulent and silent compact between church and state, priests and princes, became very real, as soon as an ecclesiastical order was established.

Infractions of this alliance or compact happened sometimes ; but in general it held ; and the joint usurpation on the liberties of mankind was the effect of it.

It was not at first perceived, that the imperial and kingly power might be controuled in time by the very expedient of the church, by which they hoped to govern more absolutely. Sins were multiplied by variety of doctrines ; and as punished by, were multiplied by discipline. That there was more solicitude to establish uniformity than orthodoxy, may be suspected of many.

Theological disputes are indeterminable in their nature,

In the first ages general councils were called by the imperial authority, and not by that of the patriarchs of Rome or Constantinople.

When metropolitans, or archbishops, began to be known in the church, is not very certain. The ecclesiastical power rose up, from a rough and broad basis, to the form of a pyramid ; and if the last stone was not laid to crown the fabric, it was attempted to be laid.

Mischievous consequences of Christianity derived from, first, *Superstition*, that took the place of *religion* ; and, 2dly, *Faith*, that took that of *morality*. To profess a belief of what no man understood, and to perform all the external duties which the church required, passed in those days, and I apprehend do still among many, for the sum of religion. So the vilest of men had and have a fairer chance of salvation in their sects (*Athanasian* or *Arian*) than the most virtuous men out of it, for the merit of acting all their lives as such — By this the vices of the laity were indulged, and the vices of the clergy covered.

Persecutions, first, religious melancholy, and even a desire of fame afterwards, might

might induce many Christians to lead an Anchoretic life, as likewise enthusiasm and church policy — that eternal bubble, the laity, paid the whole immense and growing charge.

Thus have things continued to the present age ; and the religious society among Christians has imitated successfully the policy of religious societies that flourished above three thousand years ago in the Pagan world.

The vast variety of religions which prevail in the world, are derived ultimately from a few general principles, common to all men, because they arise from the common fund of human nature : in consequence of this, many rites and ceremonies, many institutions and orders, must descend, sometimes with more, and sometimes with less affinity, to latest posterity.

Whilst the eyes of mankind were dazzled by these appearances of sanctity, which some few of the religious society, who devoted themselves without knowing that they did so for the rest, held forth ; the rest pursued the designs of their ambition with great

great art and uninterrupted perseverance—Even contrary systems were made to co-operate.

As the true spirit of religion decayed, that of superstition took place.

The authority of the Romish pontiff's primacy (pretended to be of divine institution) increased, as that of the emperor died away: they profited of the misfortunes of Italy.

It was natural for the Romans, when Rome became Christian, to desire that their bishop should represent the sovereign pontiff (as when they were heathens);—to this laical vanity and ecclesiastical ambition acceded.

A few principles uncautiously received, establish whole systems of error; and absurdity becomes capable of demonstration.

The laity believed as the church taught, and the church taught as the pope pronounced.

The Scriptures are a sure criterion of orthodoxy; when they are applied no farther than they are designed to be such. They could be designed to be such no farther

ther than they are intelligible and plain. He who intends to employ this rule any further, profanes the Scriptures, and abuses himself and others.

We know nothing more of substances than their effects; no other way can any thing be affirmed or denied concerning them. The accidents cannot remain and the substance be changed; that is, a different substance must produce different ideas in us. A supernatural operation must be sensible, or it is no more a miracle than if nothing was operated. If the elements in the eucharist continue to the sight and taste the same, they are the same bread and the same wine after consecration that they were before.

Christ gave all the proofs of the divinity of his mission by appealing to the senses of mankind. If transubstantiation is true, revelation is false.

None of the institutions contrived to preserve, or restore peace among Christians, have had this effect even from the first.—Might not then Christian flocks have fed themselves better without any
pastors

pastors at all, and the peace of the world been provided for better without religion?

The state of Christianity has been mended in some particulars, not in all: even they who remain in the papal communion have, in this respect, some obligations to those who have separated themselves from it. It must be for the good of mankind, every where, the independency of the church on the state is taken away; and in proportion where reduced; and to shew that the law of God, like its author, is immutable.

The wealth and grandeur of the church had been the free gift of the state originally; and they might be resumed therefore, whenever they became hurtful or even unnecessary, with as much justice, and better policy, than they were given.

Nothing can contribute more to the honour and advancement of Christianity, than to reduce the preachers of it, as near as possible, to the terms of their original institution.

As the church got, religion lost; the church was decorated, but religion disgraced:

graced: the cause of one and of the other was never more united in opinion, nor so distinct in reality. During several ages that preceded immediately the reformation, the whole system of Christianity in the western world, was nothing better than a system of ecclesiastical fraud, working by superstition, and on it, under the direction of the bishops of Rome.

Religion was no longer to be found in the gospel, but in the canons of councils, the opinions of fathers, and the decrees of popes.—Neither Peter nor Paul would have known how to administer the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper, unless they had gone first to some seminary of priests for instruction.

It is notorious, that many great points of Christian faith and doctrine were first taught, or first determined, several ages after the immediate disciples of Christ were dead, on the authority of tradition alone, till there was a canon of Scriptures; and on tradition and them, when there was one.

The trinity, the co-eternity, the co-equality; in a word, the sameness of the Son with the Father, the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, the fires of purgatory, and the real corporeal presence of Christ in the eucharist, to mention no more, were of this number.

The Scriptures is the word of God, the interpretation is the word of man.

Scholastic divines rendered their art, for such it was rather than a science, as incomprehensible as they could, that they might make a greater profit, and acquire a greater reputation by it among the ignorant.

Nothing supports the system now, except general ignorance in some countries; and the force of civil, abetting ecclesiastical power, on principles of political consideration among those who are not ignorant.

Reformed religions freed themselves from spiritual tyranny, but fell into spiritual anarchy.

As at the first various interpretations of authentic Scriptures, and various comments

ments upon them, divided the reformers and reformed ; every teacher had his followers, and some of these affected to preach, as well as pray by the spirit.

Christianity, genuine Christianity, is contained in the Gospels ; it is the word of God ; it requires therefore our veneration, and a strict conformity to it.

God knew from all eternity every system corporeal and intellectual, that he created in time.

I take it to be evidently false, that we have certainty of knowledge whenever we have clear and distinct ideas of any thing : our ideas are often clear and distinct, and at the same time fantastical.

To believe that there is a God, we must be taught this great principle of all religion, and receive it on authority. To know that there is one, we must go through a process of reasoning that connects certain evident truths intuitively together, and so arrives at demonstration.

The *theist* owns several necessary truths not written, nor imprinted on his mind ;

but such as he framed by observing the agreement or disagreement of his ideas, and such as he concludes every other man who has the same faculties and the same perceptions in his mind, must necessarily frame. He calls these truths eternal and immutable, relatively to that system of nature from which they result: but he cannot call them independent as properly and as consistently as the *atheist* may, since he acknowledges a first cause, an author of this and every other system of nature.

To talk of a necessary connection between truths that belong to the essence of one, and the essences of the other, seems to be little else than metaphysical nonsense, and the language of men who seek to evade what they cannot explain.

The distinction between existences and essences; the former of which, that are dependent on the will of God, drew the latter, that are independent on his will, along with them into the system of things that are, is not very clear.

The

The combinations of ideas, which are distinguished (in the schools) by the term of mixed modes (by Locke, abstract notions) and are principally of the moral kind, have no bad title to be esteemed essences—The mind makes them arbitrarily and occasionally by virtue of a power to conceive things in this manner, which God has given us. Thus even the truths we call necessary; the *æternæ veritates* of which we boast, are one way or other dependent on the supreme Being. Their necessity is not antecedent, but consequent to the existence of material and intellectual created natures. Their necessity arises from a conformity to these natures, which we are made able to discern intuitively in certain cases.

It becomes a *theist* to incline always to the side which ascribes the greatest possible power to God, from that which has even the appearance of limiting it by assuming an independency, when a dependency upon him implies no contradiction.

According

According to school metaphysicians, or logicians, one would be induced to think their meaning is, that God makes things dependent on him, to exist conformably to natures independent on him.

They who preserve their common sense free from the taint of metaphysics, will not easily conceive that their ideas, however general or abstracted, can be called, with the least propriety, immaterial essences, incorporeal substances, eternal, immutable, and so on.

To argue from the use of words to the reality of things, is no very sure method. Languages are framed by the vulgar, not by philosophers: and when names are improperly given, and words come to be improperly applied, custom establishes them soon, and they easily mislead even the minds of philosophers. Words have been invented, and applied, and names have been assigned, as men wanted, or fancied by mistake that they wanted them, to communicate their ideas with more precision, or even to conceive them more

more distinctly. Whatever advantage has been procured to the improvement of knowledge by the first manner of proceeding, much confusion and error have arisen from the second.

Though philosophers can define general natures or essences in very clear propositions, they cannot frame an idea of any general nature, which is not a particular idea of that nature.

The method of abstracting or generalizing our ideas is the universal practice of mankind.

Mr. Locke confesses, that "general and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas."

A general, universal idea is inconsistent with the real existence of things; but such a particular idea of that which may exist, becomes itself an archetype, according to which we include in the same ideal class, or exclude out of it, the objects

jects that strike our senses. Thus it becomes general by the use the mind makes of it, though it be particular, and signified by a particular word.

Those appearances, according to which the minds of men have sorted things, Mr. Locke calls nominal essences, and says they are the abstract ideas their natures stand for.—I neither comprehend how essences can be purely nominal, nor how words can be abstract ideas.—Nominal essences are nothing more than general names of particular things, not made by abstraction, but by imposition.

Our simple ideas, not one of which it is in our power to make, or to unmake; may be called properly enough *intellectual atoms*, the principles or materials of our whole intellectual system.

We can analize more easily, and with greater success, our complex into simple ideas, than we can decompound substances. In one of these operations we go up to the intellectual atoms; in the other we stop far short of the corporeal.

The

The *deficiency* of simple ideas causes one half; their *imperfection* the other half of our ignorance about the complex ideas of substances.

The powers that cause are more properly essences, than the simple ideas that are caused by them.

An essence is *that* by which a thing is what it is.

Such concrete names (as *whiteness*, &c.) were necessary to be invented, not to signify things that exist by themselves like substances, but to signify qualities, so we usually call them, that cannot exist independently of some substances in which they appear to exist, and are conveyed to the mind in the complex idea of it.

The schools endeavoured to establish the doctrine of general natures abstracted from particular, in the complex idea, without success; they then attempted it in our simple ideas: hence whiteness, blackness, &c. were confirmed in general use.

Things cannot exist in our minds, as it is impossible they should exist in nature:

I where

where we have no real essence to abstract, we have nothing to abstract.

A close affinity between the divine and the human mind, and a certain sameness of ideas and notions, is the common boast of metaphysical theologists. Their very great learning seduced good men of all communions into error. They were too good scholars to be good philosophers; and whilst their minds were filled with the thoughts of Plato, Aristotle, St. Austin, &c. there was no room for their own, or their own were grafted on these, and extended and improved from them.—“ La passion même que nous avons pour la vérité, nous trompe lorsqu'elle est trop ardente. Mais le désir de paraître savant, est ce que nous empêche le plus, d'acquerir une science véritable.” *Malebranche.*

Our proneness to measure all other beings by ourselves, grows up into strange extravagance, when we presume to measure in some sort even God by this rule. God has given us a manner of knowing fitter to our system, and sufficient for all

our

our real business in it. We can conceive no other. Is the positive nature of God, is the extent of his power, confined to the limits of our conceptions?

“ It seems evident (to *Cloyne*) that intellect is above the power of figure and motion, and that it is of a kind altogether incorporeal.” Intellect is certainly above the mere power of motion and figure, according to all the ideas we have of them; and therefore I embrace very readily the opinion of those who assume that God, who has, without any colour of doubt, notwithstanding some logical and trifling cavils, the power of doing it, has been pleased to superadd to several systems of matter, in such manner, and in such proportion, as his infinite wisdom has thought fit, the power of thinking—every other hypothesis seems inconceivable.

I see no inconveniency in speaking of the divine ideas, when we speak of the divine knowledge;—yet—I have as good a right to deny, as the most dogmatical writer can possibly have to affirm, that the supreme Being knows by the intervention of ideas.

Of the excellencies of God's nature we can have no adequate ideas; they are infinite. How he knows, or what knowledge is in him, we are unable to say. Our manner of knowing seems neither immediate, absolute, nor perfect enough to be ascribed to him.

A knowledge of things as they are, and a knowledge of the ideas of them, are extremely different; as different as immediate and reflected light, as absolute and relative knowledge: every thing is known to us in the second manner, nothing in the first; every thing is known to God in the first, and he has no need of knowing any thing in the second.

Stop enquiry where the means of knowledge stop, confess ignorance, and preserve an awful respect for the supreme Being, in contrast to divines, who treat about his nature, attributes, and providence, in a style and manner arrogant, and that no theist presumes. They strive to reduce the divine knowledge to their own low level.

Were men less ignorant of themselves, and less liable to be blinded by their affections and passions, by the force of habit, and the determining influence of self-interest, it would not be so easy as it is to impose such high opinions of the human, and such low ones of the divine nature.

Of man we have intuitive knowledge, of God demonstrative knowledge alone; which goes little further than a certainty of his existence, power, wisdom, &c.

This world, which is the scene of our action, is the scene of our knowledge: we can derive none that is real from any, whatever intellectual world we may imagine. Let us consider then how it is constituted, in what relation we stand, to what ends we are directed: let us trust to pure intellect a little less than we are advised to do, and to ourselves a little more. When we have examined and compared the information we receive from these, and have reasoned *à posteriori* from the works to the will of God, from the constitution of the system wherein we are placed by him, to our interest and duty in it,

it, let us reason cautiously; but pronounce modestly.

The law of their nature is the concern of all men alike; all men are therefore able alike to discover this law, and the constitution of things from which it is derived. Civil laws are novel, dependent on the will of man, and mutable at his pleasure.

Divines see far before them, and are determined in laying of principles by the consequences they intend to draw.

The morality of actions in a social creature is derived from that social nature which God has been pleased to give him, and not from any immutable necessity. Is it not enough that we go as high as our nature to discover the laws of it?

To what end do we make intricate by metaphysical abstractions, what God has made extremely plain?

Right reason consists in conformity with truth, and truth in a conformity with nature. Nature, or the great aggregate of things which are, is the great source from whence all the rivulets of real knowledge must be derived.

Keep within the obvious bounds of nature and truth, and presume to continue the pursuit of knowledge no further.

The will of God is something less, and the reason of things something more, in the esteem of such of those men as call themselves divines.

The great principles of moral truth are as much founded in the nature of things, as those of mathematical truth; and it is not a little less absurd to contradict the former by our words and actions, than to deny the latter.

Instinct determines sooner; appetite and passion more strongly than reason.

Reason performs by the help of experience. And what is the effect of experience? It is not to make any thing new in nature, it is to discover what was in nature, though unobserved before. We desire by instinct, we acquire by reason.— The law of nature, or of right reason, is the real original of all positive laws. The civil laws derive their authority from a conformity to this original.

A moral

C

A moral obligation may exist without a law; and a law may be such as to create no moral obligation.

Men, far from submitting to civil laws made by mere will, have submitted to these, that they might not be governed by mere will.

I am astonished at the strange perversion of reason in those men who make the abuse of natural law, as far as they can, pass for the original of all law.

Nothing but consent could form originally collective bodies of men.

Right reason is the rule of human actions, even antecedently to civil laws.

The author of all nature having given to his different creatures different natures, according to the different purposes for which they were designed in the scheme of his providence; and every one of these creatures including its own peculiar law, whether that of instinct, or that of reason; the most rational of his human creatures established from time to time rules of conduct and government conformable to it, and which are in particular instances so many republications of it.

The man who neglects the duties of natural religion, and the obligations of morality, acts against his nature, and lives in open defiance to the author of it.

Let us take things then as we find them; more curious to know what is, than to imagine what may be.

Self-love is the original spring of human actions; under the direction of instinct first, and of reason afterwards.

Instinct precedes reason in man: it supplies the want of it, or the imperfection of it, in other animals.

There is a sort of genealogy in law, in which nature begets natural law; natural law sociability; sociability union of societies by consent; and this union by consent the obligation of civil laws.

The presumption of those who pretend to deduce our moral obligations from the moral attributes of God, flows from theological absurdity and fraud.

The divine institution of the law of nature rests on fuller and more convincing proofs, both *external* and *internal*, than any that have been found, or could be

K given,

given, of the divine institution of Christianity.

Natural religion therefore being founded on human nature, the work of God, and on the necessary conditions of human happiness, which are imposed by the whole system of it; every man who receives the law of nature, receives it on his own authority, and not on that of other men, known or unknown, and in their natural state as fallible as himself. Its revelation is not communicated to him only by tradition and history: it is a perpetual and standing revelation, always made, always making, and as present in these days, as in the days of Adam, to all his offspring.

The unwritten law of God, unwritten even in the hearts of men, how early soever instinct disposes them to receive it, is an object of knowledge, not of belief.

Natural law is founded in reason, which every creature that has it may exercise, and the creature that has it not, is not subject to the law.

The Christian law is nothing else than the law of nature enforced by a new revelation.

The

The plainness and simplicity of the law of nature renders it intelligible in all times and places alike, and proportions it to the meanest understanding.

The light of nature, like that of the sun, may be eclipsed; it cannot be extinguished.—Two Proofs—first, the conscious certainty we have of, 2dly, the plainness and simplicity of, the laws of nature.

Clearness, precision, and a true conformity to the nature of things, are the perfections of human, and much more of divine laws.

Hence we may and ought to form our judgment of all laws that are assumed to be divine. They must not be incomprehensible; because, though they proceed from the divine intelligence, they are adapted to the human. God does not shew his own nature in them; he shews us our nature and our duty. By the first of which we stand in the lowest relation of intellectual creatures to their Creator; and by the last, in that of subjects and servants to a gracious and beneficent Lord and Master, who gives us laws neither

ambiguous nor captious, and who commands us nothing which it is not in our power to perform.

A third proof of the divinity of natural law; there is nothing mean or trifling in it.

Natural religion teaches us not to pray, as if we informed Omnipotence, or expostulated with Omnipotence, as those who pretend to be most reformed among Christians are accustomed to do; nor to make religion a service of shew and outward gesture as the Roman Catholics do; it teaches to worship God in spirit and in truth: that is, inwardly and sincerely. It neither confounds spiritual pride and enthusiasm, nor theatrical pomp and superstitious rites, with devotion.

There is a middle proceeding fit to be observed, between a theatrical worship, and one stripped of all outward solemnity and pomp; but it ought to pass for forms directed to this purpose; for human, not for divine ordinances.

There is nothing in the law of nature unworthy of it; and much less can it, or does it, contain any thing inconsistent with itself.

God cannot command in particular, what he forbids in general.

Benevolence to all rational beings is the fundamental law of our nature.

The good of individuals is so closely connected with the good of society, that the means of promoting one cannot be separated from those of promoting the other; and *Socrates* was in the right to curse the men who first divided, in opinion, things that cohered in nature, *morality* and *utility*.

The laws of nature are truly what lord *Bacon* stiles his Aphorisms, *The Laws of Laws*. Civil laws are always imperfect, and often false deductions from them, or applications of them; nay, they stand in many instances in direct opposition to them. It follows from hence, not that there is no *natural law*, but that *civil laws* have been made without a sufficient and constant regard to it.

Erroneous opinions of philosophers, unreasonable institutions of legislators, are often derived from the principles of nature, and may be traced up to it. The fountain

fountain from which they flowed was pure : they grew foul in their course ; and no wonder they should, since the channels through which they passed were infected with human passions, human prejudice, and human ignorance.

Such laws as cannot be traced up, even under these conditions, to the original of all law, are the arbitrary dictates of mere will, imposed on some men by the force or fraud of others, and confirmed by education and custom.

In general we may say, that the foundations of civil or politic societies were laid by *nature*, though they are the creatures of art. Societies were begun by instinct, and improved by experience.

The first principles of every thing that require human understanding, and human industry to be employed about it, are rightly laid in nature ; they are obvious to our search, and are able to discover and pursue the consequences of them in speculation and practice.

How men came into the world reason will tell us no better than history or tradition does.

That

That instinct which determines parents to take care of their children, gives them by the law of nature, all that authority over them, without which they could not take this care. This authority is and must be absolute, whilst the children are unable to judge for, and to direct themselves. It becomes limited when their children are able to do this without their help, and yet continue in the same family. It ceases when their children go out of their family, and acquire independency, or even parental dominion of their own.

Authors, by repeating one another, propagate the same mistakes very often, and increase the number of witnesses, without strengthening the testimony. They are also apt to exaggerate in their descriptions, and the characters they draw.

On the whole, it cannot be doubted, I think, that the first societies of men were those of families formed by nature, and governed by natural law; nor that kingdoms and states were the second.

Neighbourhood, an intercourse of good offices, and in a word, mutual convenience,

ency, might give a beginning by the union of independent families, under compacts and covenants to civil society. But the principal cause of such artificial or political unions was of a very different kind.

As fast as the distribution of mankind into families, and as paternal government ceased, men went out of a natural into a political state.

Individuality belongs to communities, not to persons.

Societies become in all respects individuals; that is, they have no regard to others except relatively to themselves; and self-love, that prompted union among men, promotes discord among them.

If reason could supply the place of instinct, be always at hand, and determine with as much force, men might be as good citizens as bees. But the rational creatures neglect their reason, or degrade her in the intellectual œconomy, and make her the vile instrument of their appetites and passions. What reason cannot do by herself, she does in some degree by the adventitious helps which experience enables

enables her to acquire, by orders and rules of government which every man concurs to maintain ; because every man is willing to controul the passions, and restrain the excesses of others, whatever indulgence he has for his own. I said, in some degree ; for even with these adventitious helps, reason preserves human societies unequally, and by a perpetual conflict : whereas instinct preserves those of bees in one uniform tenor, and without any conflict at all. The passions rebel against reason ; but instinct is reason, and passion both.

Bees live with bees in their several hives, and have much advantage over men in domestic life ; but their sociability goes no further : whenever any of their families, for to such they may be compared, transmigrate, or send out colonies to seek new habitations, cruel wars ensue.

It is not quite the same in the case of mankind ; their families or hords, and the colonies they send out, unite often for mutual utility.—Here is the difference.

Where there is no certainty, we must all guess ; and probabilities must be weighed.

The first kings were limited monarchs; they earned the sovereignty by great and good actions, held it from their people, and were accountable to their people for the exercise of it. Such I mean as came to their crowns by consent, and in countries where common utility united families in civil society, and neither conquest nor the fear of it.

Political societies grew out of natural; and civil governments were formed, not by the concurrence of individuals, but by the association of families.

The question is not, whether men lived together in the state of nature since the world was their common habitation, but what the state of nature was; whether it was composed of men who lived together in families, and whether these families, by living together, gave a beginning to political societies; or whether it was composed of as many solitary individuals as there were men in the world; and whether these men, independent and equal one amongst another, met amicably together, and

and set up government without any better preparation for it.

We may distinguish a personal and a social equality.

That all men are born to be free, is undoubtedly true.

The first impressions that are made on societies, like those on particular men, last long, and the worst longest.

However unlike nations may be to nations in their dispositions and manners, all of them, even the weakest, seek their own advantage, real or imaginary, at the expence of others.

Most transmigrations established themselves into societies by invasion first, and mixing with the conquered after—the Jews only by extermination.

The great commonwealth of mankind cannot be reduced under one government, nor subsist without any.

Whether men are compounded of two substances or no may be doubted; but that they have in one substance two principles of determination cannot be doubted.

Our legal violations of natural law have a solemn varnish of policy, and even of religion, which the casuists of the law, and those of the gospel throw over them, and which always disguise, although they cannot always hide them. Illiterate savage nations have no such varnish to employ, and their laws and customs appear to every eye, but their own, as unnatural, and as abominable, as they are.

“ The tables of natural law are hung up in the works of God, and are obvious to the sight of man.” No political society ever framed a law in direct and avowed contradiction to them.

The difficulty of applying general and even common notions to particulars, is one great cause of the errors and misfortunes of mankind.

Hence the prejudices, for so they may properly be called, were at first universally, as they are still in many parts of the world, the prejudices of real ignorance: to these succeeded those of fantastic knowledge, wherever men advanced from simplicity

plicity to refinement: " à necessariis ad " elegantiora." *Quæ pejora tulere?*

The confusion grew so great, that the laws of nature, and those of positive institution, were but ill distinguished; and that some or all of the first kind passed for laws of the second; whilst some of the second passed for laws of the first.

Matrimony forms families which could not be formed without it; and families form states, which could not be formed without them.

Polygamy had been allowed in most nations—Divorce I believe in all.

Marriages within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity are forbid by political institutions, and for political reasons; but are left indifferent by the law of nature, which determines nothing expressly about them.

As occasions are various, circumstances different, and will above all uncertain, so have the restraints been very inconsistently laid on marriage.

The laws of nature are general; and in this case, as in all others, the particular appli-

application of them, and the means of securing their effects, are left to common prudence. “ Increase and multiply” is the law of nature: the manner in which this precept shall be executed with greatest advantage to society, is the law of man. When the latter promotes the execution of the former without breaking any other general law of nature, it is conformable to this law.

As theists we cannot believe the all-perfect Being liable to one of the greatest human imperfections, *i. e.* to contradict himself. Nothing is more conformable to our idea of such a Being, than to believe that human reason cannot account for the proceedings of infinite wisdom in a multitude of instances; in many of those perhaps which seem the most obvious to it. But nothing is at the same time more inconsistent with this idea, than to believe that this Being perplexes his laws with apparent contradictions, or deviates from them like human legislators in the particular application of them; and that God, who never acts against the perfections of his

his own nature, commands his creatures upon any occasion to act against the perfection of theirs.—A sincere and consistent theist must look on the thirteenth chapter of Deuteronomy as an example of human laws, that command what the laws of nature forbid.

The gospel of *Christ* is one continued lesson of the strictest morality, of justice, of benevolence, and of universal charity.

The miracles wrought by him and his apostles in a mild, beneficent spirit, tended to the good of mankind; whereas the miracles Moses wrought in the fierce and cruel spirit of *Judaism*, tended to the destruction of mankind.

As long as *Christ's* spirit remained in his church, the *Mosaical* (which he had reproved in his disciples) which is as opposite to his law, as to the law of nature, could not arise.

Reject every law, whether perpetual or occasional; whether given to the Jews alone, or jointly to others, that is evidently repugnant to the laws of nature and of right reason; to the precepts of the gospel; to the

the example of CHRIST; to the practice of his first disciples; and to the genuine spirit of the religion they taught.—If this was the spirit of God in the days of Christ, it was the spirit of God in the days of MOSES: and whatever difference there might be in the several dispensations, and the objects of them, God could have effected his purposes without contradicting his spirit.

To shew then the more evidently, how absurd, as well as impious, it is to ascribe the Mosaical laws to God, let it be considered, that neither the people of Israel, nor their legislator, perhaps, knew any thing of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this are to be punished. If Moses knew, he deceived the people in the covenant they made, by his intervention with God. If he did not know, God deceived both him and them. In either case the conditions of obedience and disobedience were not fully nor fairly stated.

Men are fitted to know a little of some few things; the whole of nothing.

Socrates thought that human errors about the will of God, and the duty of man, proceeded

proceeded from pride more than ignorance.

—I add curiosity.

The natural, divine religion which the philosophers discovered, is the foundation of the Christian: there is not one moral precept in the gospel, which was not taught by heathen philosophers.

The antient Chinese held it unlawful to dispute about the divine nature, the attributes of God, the exercise of his power, or the conduct of his providence.

They observed the order of nature, and from thence they deduced all the rules of private morality and public policy.—That reason should preside over passion, was their great rule of life.

There are three kinds of moral obligations; first, those of an individual; 2dly, of the member of a family; 3dly, of the member of a political society.

When men had once departed from simplicity and truth in the search of mystery, they soon imagined themselves capable of attaining unattainable knowledge: the most chimerical past for real; and they boasted of nothing less than to ex-

plain the whole scheme, order, and state of things. Thus reason was abused by pretended science, and natural religion was deformed by metaphysical speculations and superstitious devotions.

They who cannot persuade themselves that the religion they see practised, is a service fit to be paid to a supreme Being, slide easily, from the belief that there is no religion, to the belief that there is no God.

The consequence of refining in matters of religion beyond the obvious dictates of nature and reason, has been superstition and enthusiasm, or atheism, not reformation of manners in China.

However it was brought about, *Art* took every where the place of *Nature*, and *Faith of Reason*.

Pythagoras enveloped his doctrines in mystery to make them pass for divine; laid the foundations of them out of the ken of human reason; and acquired a great reputation in metaphysics and divine philosophy by the usual method, by not being understood.

Where-

Where-ever superstition prevails, those sins which the priests make by forbidding what the law of nature has left indifferent, or by imposing duties that have no relation to true religion, will be always esteemed the greatest sins; therefore what are no sins, may be expiated very properly by punishments which are no punishments; and several ceremonies performed may atone for several omitted. But the abuse is abominable, when the same expiations and atonements are applied to real sins, and priests do little else than dispense arbitrarily with the laws of nature, which are the laws of God.

It is not much to revelation, to ascribe to it what may be the effect of imposture and error; and enthusiasm is no more a proof of true religion than martyrdom is of a good cause.

The theology contained in the gospel, lies in a very narrow compass: it is marvellous indeed, but it is plain; and it is employed throughout to enforce natural religion. This seems to be the end, and

revealed religion the means ; both which it would have been for the honour of Christianity and good of mankind to have left so.

Natural religion held but the second place in their system ; and righteousness of faith became much more important than righteousness of works.

Revolts against government, and disorders of every kind, have been at least as frequent in the Christian world as in the Pagan.

Sociability is the great instinct, and benevolence the great law of human nature, which no other law can repeal, or alter.

Among those people whom we call barbarous, &c. we find the light of nature, though not of the gospel, shining, though faintly indeed ; some rules of moral life, some laws for the maintenance of society, some awe and reverence of a Being superior to man, some reward for virtue, some punishment for vice.

If natural religion is discoverable by all men, the revealed is so by none.

Men

Men are condemned without any fault of theirs: one sole and uniform condition of saving themselves is imposed on all of them, and the greatest part are deprived even of the knowledge of this condition.

The force of habit familiarizes the grossest absurdities to our reason, as it does the most disagreeable sensations to our senses.

The concurrent testimony of cotemporary, disinterested, and unprejudiced authors is, no doubt, a principal foundation of the credibility of any history.

Goodness and justice are not the same in God, which they are in our ideas, but something transcendent; it is impossible we should argue with any certainty about them.

Great men, in common estimation, are sometimes great triflers.

Every thing shews the wisdom and power of God according to our ideas of wisdom and power in the physical world and in the moral; but every thing does not shew in like manner the justness and goodness

goodness of God conformably to our ideas of these attributes in either.

A self-existent Being, the first cause of all things, infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, is the God of natural theology.

We have no knowledge beyond our duty, nor any duty beyond our knowledge.

Fantastic knowledge became as indulgent to self-love, and to the pride of the human heart, as real ignorance had ever been.

The dispensations of providence in the distribution of good and evil, stand in no need of any hypothesis to justify them.

Reason will neither deny nor affirm, that there is to be a future state: and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in it has so great a tendency to enforce civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that reason, who cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide against it on principles of good policy.

We

We are apt to carry the judgments we make into extremes, and the characters we give into panegyrics or satires.

Argue from knowledge, not from imagination ; and advance nothing more than the former will justify.

The demonstration of God's existence is founded in knowledge, and pursued with intuitive certainty through every step of it.

To choose the best guide, and to proportion the means to it, is the very definition of wisdom.

Since infinite wisdom not only established the end, but directed the means, the system of the universe must be necessarily the best of all possible systems ; which it could not be, nor even a consistent scheme, unless the whole was the final cause of every part, and no one nor more parts the final causes of the whole.

The great and natural parts of our solar system act on one another in more ways than philosophy has been yet able to discover ; and that of comets is not, perhaps, the only communication that other systems have with ours.

God

God neither contrives nor executes like man. His means are simple, his purposes various : and the same system that answers the greatest, answers the least. Thus regard has been had to man, and not to him alone, but to all other animals, according to their different natures and ends.

Democritus, Epicurus, Strato, Alphonsus of Castile ; in short, all the makers and menders of worlds, shewed nothing but their ignorance and their presumption. They attempted to rise above God, and they are become the jest of mankind.

The moral attributes of the supreme Being are absorbed in his wisdom.

The wisdom is not so often discernible by us as the power of God, nor the goodness as the wisdom.

The evils we complain of are constant or occasional effects of the constitution of a world that was not made for our sakes. But the means to soften some, to prevent others, and to palliate and even to cure those that cannot be prevented, are so many instances of the positive goodness of God.

Natural

Natural philosophy leads irresistibly to natural theology, and gives a just contempt for the figments and hypotheses of artificial.—Read, contemplate, adore, give thanks, and be resigned.

Whilst natural philosophy was ill cultivated, and ill understood indeed, men founded their objections to the wisdom of God in their ignorance.

All that is finite, the most exalted intelligences, must be liable to some errors.

An hypothesis which the phænomena contradict, or which is inconsistent even with one of them, is not admissible. An hypothesis which they all concur to establish, is scarce an hypothesis.

Remote considerations, though they are believed, have not indeed the same influence that immediate objects have; but they have an influence proportionable to the belief of them.

How should finite measure infinite? God's manner of knowing is ours no more than his manner of being.

Defend Providence by arguments drawn from the nature of man, and the actual constitution of the world.

Let us be prepared to meet with several appearances which we cannot explain, nor therefore reconcile to the ideas we endeavour to form of the divine perfections; so we may secure ourselves from error by a modest avowal of ignorance, where human knowledge ceases.

There is surely no metaphysical nor theological presumption mad enough to assert, that we are capable of knowing what the constitution, order, and harmony of the universe require.

The nature of every creature, his manner of being, is adapted to his state here, to the place he is to inhabit, and, as we may say, to the part he is to act. It were preposterous if man were superior or inferior to what he is.

Philosophers have not shewn in every instance why every thing is what it is, and as it is; or that nothing could be in any one case otherwise than as it is, without producing a greater inconveniency to the whole,

whole, than the particular inconveniency that would be removed.

Necessary agents employ all their power, conformably to the laws of nature, in promoting the same end ; that is, in carrying on the physical system. So rational agents should employ all their faculties in preserving the order of the moral system ; which reason discovers to be their common duty, and reason and experience to be their common interest.

The seeming imperfection of the parts is necessary to the real perfection of the whole. The general state of mankind in the present scheme of Providence, is not only tolerable, but happy.

Servitude to law is real liberty ; and the regulation of pleasure is real happiness. Pleasures are the objects of self-love ; happiness that of reason.

Reason was not given to destroy, but to direct and govern the passions, to make them as beneficial as they are necessary in the human system.

God, when he gave us reason, left us to our own free will to make a proper or

improper use of it; so that we are obliged to our Creator for a certain rule and sufficient means of arriving at happiness: we have none to blame but ourselves when we miss of it.

Neither perfect virtue nor perfect happiness are to be found among the sons of men.

He alone is happy, and truly so, who can say, Welcome life whatever it brings! welcome death whatever it is!—*Aut transfert, aut finit.*

This we are sure of, we shall be dealed with according to the perfections of God's nature; not according to the imperfections of our own.

They are equally foolish and presumptuous who make imaginary excursions into futurity, and who complain of the present.

I neither deny nor affirm particular providences—But this I say, that the physical and moral systems have no need, like the bungling works and imperfect institutions of men, to be carried on by frequent interpositions and partial directions, that they may continue to answer the end of the Maker.

God

God punishes to reform as far as our nature and his scheme permit.

Who are to be reputed good Christians?
—Orthodoxy is a mode.

As proud as we are of our rationality, certain it is, that reason unmixed, uninfluenced, has less to do than we imagine in framing the opinions, and directing the judgments of men.

Sublime metaphysical reason, which deals so much in abstract ideas, is so imaginary, and by consequence so vague, that it serves the purpose of every divine alike in all their discordant opinions. Metaphysician never convinced metaphysician.

Miracle consists in the extraordinary interposition, as much as in the nature of the thing brought to pass.

Whether we suppose situations and conjunctures prepared for men, or men prepared for situations and conjunctures, they may act by the freedom of their will, against all these preparations and destinations, in spite of time, place, and circumstance.

May be is no proof that *there is*.

Phi-

Philosophers are so afraid of ignorance, that they expose themselves to error, which is worse.

Dangerous are these expressions whose obvious sense is literal to all; whilst the analogical is understood by few, and attended to by fewer.

God acts according to a multitude of relations unknown to us. He acts relatively to his system, we judge relatively to ours.

Knowledge which rests in analogy, stops short, and is not knowledge.

The supposition is impertinent, that moral fitnesses and unfitnesses are known, by the eternal reason of things, to all rational beings as well as to God.

Superstition, improved by philosophy, succeeded that which was rude and unsystematized; and learning and knowledge finished what ignorance had begun.

The religious revere, the superstitious fear God.

Analogy is a similitude or resemblance of an object with some diversity.

A bible without a comment can be reconciled neither to itself, nor to what we know of physical and moral nature; and with a comment it is in a multitude of instances the word of man more than the word of God.—Mysteries! untruths!

Demonstration cannot arise from real, and much less from assumed similitude or figure. It must be established on intuitive and sensitive knowledge: the *similitudes* may be assumed, and *figures* employed falsely.

To be truly *orthodox*, and in a state of *salvation*, it was sufficient to submit blindly to the authority of the church, and to procure the advancement of it against law, reason, and every moral obligation.

To be *heretical*, and in a state of *damnation*, it was sufficient to refuse the submission, or to resist the usurpation * * *

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F I N I S.



